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UNDERSTANDING THE GENERAL WILL 
RICHARD DAGGER 
Arizona State University 
EW CONCEPTS in the history of political thought have proved so 
troublesome as Rousseau's notion of the general will. Rousseau must 
bear much of the blame for this, of course, for the discussion of the 
general will in his Social Contract is uncharacteristically terse and abstract. 
Troublesome as it has been, though, there is reason to believe that we are 
now approaching an adequate understanding of the general will. I say this 
because there seems to be growing agreement among Rousseau's commen- 
tators that the general will not only can be understood, but that it can best be 
understood in rationalistic terms.' Indeed, where explications once were 
couched in terms of "real" and "higher" wills, one is now more likely to find 
the general will explained in terms of the prisoners' dilemma and Pareto- 
optimality.2 
While I do not accept all of these rationalistic readings of the general 
will, I do share the general conviction that we can make sense of Rousseau's 
concept, and his argument, without resorting to metaphysics or psychology. 
What I shall offer here, accordingly, is in some respects only a variation on a 
theme now well known to students of Rousseau's political philosophy. It is an 
important variation nonetheless, for it enables us to reconcile passages in the 
Social Contract which otherwise appear to be contradictory. That, at least, is 
what I shall argue in this essay. 
I proceed in the following manner. First I set out a general account of 
what Rousseau means by "the general will" - an account which resembles in 
its main lines, if not all its details, Brian Barry's analysis of the general will.3 
This account is defended in the second part of the essay, where I show how 
it helps us to understand two of the more controversial aspects of Rousseau's 
argument in the Social Contract. In part three I extend this account (and 
provide the variation mentioned in the last paragraph) by drawing a distinc- 
tion, implicit and almost unmarked in Rousseau's writings, between the gen- 
eral will and a general will. With the aid of this distinction, I argue, we can 
make sense of Rousseau's baffling and apparently contradictory remarks 
about voting. Once this is demonstrated, I conclude by raising some ques- 
tions about the utility of the concept of the general will. 
NOTE: I wish to thank Terence Ball, Peter Fuss, C. B. Macpherson, and this journal's anony- 
mous referees for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
'I include the following, inter alia, in this category: Glen Allen, "La Volonte de tous and La Volonte 
generale: A Distinction and Its Significance," Ethics 71 Uuly 1961): 263-75; George Kateb, 
"Aspects of Rousseau's Political Thought," Political Science Quarterly 76 (December 1961): 
519-43; James McAdam, "What Rousseau Meant by the General Will," Dialogue 5 (1967): 
498-515; Roger Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton: Princeton Univer- 
sity Press, 1968), esp. pp. 323-35; and Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's 
Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), esp. pp. 184-97. Further 
examples of rationalistic readings of the general will are cited in the next two footnotes. 
2 For an explanation of the general will in terms of the prisoners' dilemma, see W. G. Runciman 
and A. K. Sen, "Games, Justice and the General Will," Mind 74 (1965): 554-62; for an 
explanation in terms of Pareto-optimality, see Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Indi- 
vidual Interests (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 99-107. 
Brian Barry, "The Public Interest," in Political Philosophy, ed. Anthony Quinton (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), esp. pp. 119-26. For similar interpretations, see Andrew 
Levine, The Politics of Autonomy: A Kantian Reading of Rousseau's Social Contract (Amherst, 
Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1976), pp. 40-43, and John Charvet, The Social 
Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 
chapter 4. 
360 Western Political Quarterly 
I 
The idea of the general will rests on a fundamental distinction between 
two aspects of a person. Everyone, in Rousseau's view, may be thought of as 
both a man - an actual, identifiable person - and a citizen. Insofar as we 
are men, we are each unique; each of us, that is, has his own particular 
identity and set of interests. Insofar as we are citizens, however, we are alike 
in that we are members of the public; and as members of the public we share 
a common interest in the welfare of the body politic. Everyone, con- 
sequently, has both a particular interest as a man and a general interest as a 
citizen. 
From the distinction between man and citizen Rousseau moves to a 
corresponding distinction between the particular or private will and the gen- 
eral will. The private will aims at the fulfillment of the particular interest of 
a man, an actual individual, while the general will seeks to further the inter- 
est of the citizen. Since the interests of all citizens are the same, the object of 
the general will may be said to be the common good or public interest - that 
is, the interest we all share as members of the public. Rousseau distinguishes 
the private from the general will in this manner: "the private will tends by its 
nature toward preferences, and the general will toward equality." (II,1:59.)4 
As men with private wills, we naturally tend to grant precedence to our own 
interests and desires. The private will is partial both because it is the will of 
an identifiable individual, one who is only part of the body politic, and 
because it is biased: it places a higher value on the interests of the self than 
on the interests of others. The general will, in contrast, tends to equality 
because it necessarily grants equal consideration to everyone's interests; or, 
at least, to everyone within the body politic. Because it focuses on the com- 
mon interest we share as citizens, the general will is impartial: it considers 
only the interests of the abstract person Rousseau calls the citizen. Since we 
are all the same qua citizen, the general will is devoted equally to all. 
An example may help to clarify this distinction. Consider the case of 
someone who has the ability to be an unusually adept burglar. Such a person 
may well find it in his interest, as a man, to put his skills to use. His private 
will may then be to steal from others in order to satisfy his own desires. The 
general will, however, directs our potential burglar to obey the law. Since it is 
the will of the citizen, the general will requires us to ignore at times our 
particular interests and personal attributes - our possessions, our position 
in society, our abilities - and to think of ourselves only as members of the 
public. Laws against burglary are in the interests of all citizens, if not all 
men; and if our potential burglar thinks of himself only as a citizen, he will 
recognize that he ought to respect the law. 
As I understand it, then, the general will performs much the same 
function as John Rawls's "veil of ignorance."5 Rawls argues that a hypotheti- 
cal social contract will produce generally acceptable principles of justice if 
the parties to that hypothetical contract choose these principles from a prop- 
erly defined "initial situation." The main feature of this situation is the "veil 
of ignorance," which deprives the parties to the contract of most informnation 
about their personal identities. More precisely, the parties do not know what 
their socioeconomic positions are, what abilities or disabilities they have, or 
4All citations in parentheses refer to the book, chapter, and page number in On the Social 
Contract, ed. Roger Masters and trans. Judith Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978). 
The reference here is to Book II, chapter one, page 59. 
5See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), ?24, 
"The Veil of Ignorance." 
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even what their particular aspirations happen to be. Thus Rawls asks the 
individual to blind himself to his private interests and to assume an abstract 
identity so that the principles he choosesfor all will be acceptable to all. 
Behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls points out, "No one knows his situation 
in society nor his natural assets, and therefore no one is in a position to tailor 
principles to his advantage."6 In this way the veil of ignorance forces the 
parties to the contract to adopt a common viewpoint; or, to put it in Rous- 
seau's terms, the veil of ignorance leads the parties to promote their com- 
mon interest as citizens rather than their private interests as men. The terms 
are different, but the point is much the same. 
There is also a moral dimension to the general will, just as there is to the 
veil of ignorance. Rousseau does not invoke the general will simply as a 
counterweight to selfish interests. This would be futile, for one's interest as a 
man may well outweigh one's interest as a citizen. An industrialist may find, 
for instance, that when all things are considered it is not in his interest to 
install pollution-inhibiting devices in his smokestacks, even though it is in his 
interest as a citizen to reduce air pollution. Rousseau's claim, however, is that 
in some cases we ought to consider only our interests as citizens. The purpose 
of the general will, therefore, is to provide a principle which will lead to just 
public policy. If we consider the interests of the citizen and not those of men, 
Rousseau maintains, we will reach decisions which establish laws and policies 
in accordance with the common interest. This is possible because from the 
standpoint of the citizen - as members of the public - we share the same 
interests. Considered abstractly, as citizens, the burglar and his victim share a 
common interest in the enforcement of a law against burglary, just as the 
industrialist and the person who lives near his factory share a common 
interest in eliminating air pollution. What Rousseau suggests, in sum, is that 
only the general will of the citizen, and not the private will of the man, is 
relevant to public policy decisions. 
When Rousseau uses the notion of the general will, then, he singles out 
a certain perspective - a moral perspective - and claims that this is the only 
perspective we ought to consider in reaching public decisions. In this sense 
the general will is a moral imperative or principle, and its purpose is to 
guarantee that the claims of no particular individuals are given preference. 
Everyone receives equal consideration because public decisions take into ac- 
count only the viewpoint of the citizen. Any other perspective is at best 
morally irrelevant. Here we see the emphasis on equality which is such a 
marked characteristic of Rousseau's political philosophy. Thus Rousseau 
writes that 
the social compact established an equality between the citizens uch that they 
all engage themselves under the same conditions and should all benefit from 
the same rights. Thus by the very nature of the compact, every act of 
sovereignty, which is to say every authentic a t of the general will, obligates or 
favors all citizens equally, so that the sovereign knows only the nation as a body 
and makes no distinctions between any of those who compose it. (II, 4:63; 
emphasis added.) 
A further implication is that laws established in accordance with the 
general will do more than grant equal consideration to everyone: they actu- 
ally are in everyone's interest. For a law sanctioned by the general will pro- 
motes everyone's interest qua citizen. Such a law may not be the first choice 
of many individuals, but it is acceptable to all because it makes some con- 
6Ibid., ?24, p. 139. 
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tribution to everyone's well-being. It is, as Barry has said, "a sort of highest 
common factor of agreement."7 
There is also a close connection between the general will and Rousseau's 
conception of moral freedom. If the people are furnished with adequate 
information, Rousseau says, and are allowed no communication when they 
deliberate (to prevent logrolling), the outcome of their vote will conform to 
the general will. Everyone can vote for and obey laws which are in his 
interest as a citizen (although everyone might prefer to vote for and obey 
laws which are in his interest as a man), and this satisfies Rousseau's defini- 
tion of moral freedom as "obedience to the law one has prescribed for 
oneself.. ." (1,8:56.) 
Two other points should be noted before I take up the defense of this 
interpretation. This way of understanding the general will is consistent, in 
the first place, with what Rousseau has to say about groups within the body 
politic. There is a sense in which each of these groups, or "partial associa- 
tions," has its own general will, for the individuals who compose each group 
share a common interest in their capacities as members of that association. 
These groups, in other words, may be considered publics. When we regard 
them from the perspective of the body politic, however, it is clear that the 
will of each association is a private will - a will which may be antagonistic to 
the general will of the state. Rousseau disapproves of these associations, 
consequently, because he fears that they will divide and divert the loyalty of 
the people; men will come to think of themselves as merchants and farmers, 
Catholics and Protestants, rather than citizens. When this happens, Rousseau 
warns, the private wills of these groups will prevent the general will from 
prevailing when the people vote. 
Understanding the general will as a principle meant to guide public 
decisions is also consistent, secondly, with Rousseau's remarks on the limits 
of the general will. According to Rousseau, the general will applies to laws, 
but not to decrees. A law is a general policy, a rule which governs the 
conduct of every member of the body politic, while a decree is an act which 
refers to particular, identifiable individuals. The general will "loses its 
natural rectitude when it is directed toward any individual, determinate 
object. Because then, judging what is foreign to us, we have no true principle 
of equity to guide us." (II,4:62.)8 There is no true principle of equity in these 
cases because men are involved, not citizens. Instead of appealing to the 
general will, then, we must decide on the merits of the particular case - and 
these decisions are best left to executives and judges, not to the people as a 
whole. 
II 
The foregoing account of the general will is little more than a sketch of 
what I take to be the most plausible interpretation. What I want to do in this 
section is to elaborate and defend this account by presenting two kinds of 
evidence for it. 
There is, to begin with, the evidence to be found in the way Rousseau 
talks about the general will. The fact that Rousseau distinguishes the general 
will from the will of all is evidence enough that the general will is not merely 
whatever the people, or most of them, may want at any particular time. This 
does not lead immediately to the conclusion that the general will should be 
understood as a principle, of course, since it leaves open the possibility that 
7Barry, "The Public Interest," p. 120. 
8See also the chapter on "Law" (11,6). 
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the general will is some sort of metaphysical entity, such as a "higher will." 
But it is difficult, at best, to square this metaphysical view with Rousseau's 
reference in Political Economy to "the maxims of the general will ...." For 
while maxims may be derived from principles, they can not be derived from 
metaphysical entities. 
Other evidence of this sort provides more direct support for the claim 
that the general will is best understood as the principle to be followed in 
matters of public policy. In another passage in Political Economy, Rousseau 
describes the general will as "the first principle of public economy and the 
fundamental rule of government.. .."10 And in the Social Contract, Book II, 
Rousseau proclaims that 
what generalizes the will is not so much the number of votes as the common 
interest hat unites them, because in this institution everyone necessarily 
subjects himself to the conditions he imposes on others, an admirable 
agreement between interest and justice which confers on common delibera- 
tions a quality of equity that vanishes in the discussion of private matters, for 
want of a common interest hat unites and identifies the rule of the judge 
with that of the party. 
However one traces the principle, one always reaches the same conclusion, 
namely that the social compact established an equality between the citizens 
such that they all engage themselves under the same conditions and should 
all benefit from the same rights. (11,4:63; emphasis added.)1' 
In reaching public decisions, that is, the sovereign should consider the inter- 
ests of the citizens, and not the men, who compose it; for it is this concern 
for "the common interest that unites them" that generalizes the will. We 
generalize the will, therefore, when we act on Rousseau's principle: vote as a 
citizen, not as a man. 
If these passages do not absolutely prove that the general will is best 
understood as a principle or imperative, they certainly provide strong sup- 
port for that interpretation. Further support can be found, moreover, in 
evidence of a second kind. This consists in showing that the interpretation I 
have set out enables us to make sense of some of the more controversial and 
perplexing aspects of the Social Contract. Here I shall consider the following 
questions: (1) What does Rousseau mean when he says that one may be 
"forced to be free"? and (2) What is the difference between the general will 
and the will of all? 
(1) The claim that someone may be "forced to be free," found in Book 
I, chapter seven of the Social Contract, strikes many readers as self- 
contradictory. How can one be forced to be free, it is asked, when freedom is 
the very absence of coercion? Much depends on what one means by "free- 
dom," of course, and this objection holds only if the word is understood in 
this narrow, "negative" sense. Rousseau himself conceives of three orders of 
freedom - natural, civil, and moral - and he defines moral freedom, as we 
have seen, as "obedience to the law one has prescribed for oneself." When he 
says that one may be forced to be free, then, he means that one may be 
compelled to obey a law to which he has given his consent. 
This does not meet all objections, however. For why should one have to be 
forced to obey a law to which one has consented? Isn't this contradictory? Given 
9Political Economy, in On the Social Contract, ed. Masters, p. 223; emphasis added. 
"'Ibid., p. 213; emphasis in original. 
Note also the following passage from the Geneva Manuscript: "If the common interest is the object 
of the association, it is clear that the general will should be the rule of the social body's actions. 
This is the fundamental principle I have tried to establish." On the Social Contract, ed. Masters, 
p. 174. 
364 Western Political Quarterly 
Rousseau's distinction between private wills and the general will, it clearly is not. 
The private will of one who cheats on his taxes, for instance, is in conflict with 
his general will as a citizen. The cheater may "view what he owes the common 
cause as a free contribution, the loss of which will harm others less than its 
payment burdens him" and consequently "wish to enjoy the rights of the citizen 
without wanting to fulfill the duties of a subject .. ." (1,7:55.) These two wills 
are in conflict because the cheater wants to enjoy the benefits of the social order 
- "the rights of the citizen" - without contributing his share to the mainte- 
nance of that order - "the duties of a subject." If he follows his private will, he 
acts against "the general will he has as a citizen." (1,7:55.) The spread of this 
kind of injustice, Rousseau observes, 
would cause the ruin of the body politic. 
Therefore, in order for the social compact not to be an ineffectual 
formula, it tacitly includes the following engagement, which alone can give 
force to the others: that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be 
constrained to do so by the entire body; which means only that he will be 
forced to be free. For this is the condition that, by giving each citizen to the 
homeland, guarantees him against all personal dependence... and alone 
gives legitimacy to civil engagements which without it would be absurd, 
tyrannical, and subject to the most enormous abuses. (1,7:55.) 
The state, according to the view set out here, is a cooperative enterprise, 
and the citizens are all pledged to share its burdens. Only those who try to 
evade this contractual duty - those who "wish to enjoy the rights of the 
citizen without wanting to fulfill the duties of a subject" - must be "forced 
to be free." These individuals are nowadays called "free riders." The tax 
cheater mentioned earlier is a free rider, for example, because he wishes to 
receive the benefits of social cooperation without contributing his fair share, 
whatever it may be, toward the provision of those benefits. If the number of 
free riders is relatively small, then the benefits of social cooperation will still 
be provided; but when their numbers go beyond a threshold, they may well 
render social cooperation impossible. In large groups the temptation to ride 
free is especially strong, and Rousseau recognizes that some means must be 
found to encourage men to honor their commitments. Otherwise, he says, 
the sovereign "would have no guarantee of the subjects' engagements if it 
did not find ways to be assured of their fidelity." (I,7:55.)12 
One may still wonder what all this has to do with freedom. Why not 
simply say that members of the body politic will not be allowed to take unfair 
advantage of one another? The answer is that Rousseau speaks of freedom 
here because he considers the state - or at least the de jure state he sketches 
in the Social Contract - to be the realm of freedom. The just state grants 
equal rights and protection to all, thereby helping to secure everyone from 
personal dependence. Anyone who accepts and follows social rules whenever 
they favor him, yet breaks them when it serves his purposes, is contributing 
to the destruction of that realm. Such a person is a parasite whose actions 
threaten his own freedom as well as that of others. And this is why Rousseau 
says that the free rider must be "forced to be free": forced, that is, to act in 
accordance with his own will as a citizen.13 
12 For a discussion of the relationship between group size and the conduct of members of the 
group, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), 
esp. chap. 2. Note also Rousseau's preference for small communities: e.g., in Social Contract 
(111,13). 
13 Cf. Brian Barry's explanation in Political Argument (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), 
p. 198: "Rousseau does not deny that it may be in your interest to break a law which 
benefits you qua member of the community; all he says is that it is certainly in your 
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(2) Understanding the general will as a principle also helps to make 
sense of Rousseau's distinction between the general will and the will of all. 
This distinction is set out in the following paragraph: 
There is often a great difference between the will of all and the general 
will. The latter considers only the common interest; the former considers 
private interest, and is only a sum of private wills. But take away from these 
same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel each other out, and the re- 
maining sum of the differences i the general will. (11,3:61.) 
The object of this paragraph ostensibly is to elucidate, but many readers 
have found that it has the opposite effect. John Plamenatz, for instance, has 
charged that this quasi-mathematical account of the general will is, if taken 
literally, "sheer nonsense." According to Plamenatz, the "pluses" and 
"minuses" of private wills must be that which is peculiar to each of them, and 
the mathematical explanation is then: 
Let John's be x+a, Richard's x+b, and Thomas's x+c; x being what is com- 
mon to them all, and a, b, and c, what is peculiar to each. If the general will 
is what remains after the "pluses" and "minuses" have cancelled each other 
out, it is x; but if it is the sum of the differences, it is a+b+c. Whichever it is, 
it cannot be both; and the second alternative is too absurd to be considered. 
Beware of political philosophers who use mathematics, no matter how sim- 
ple, to illustrate their meanings!14 
Here the problem arises from Rousseau's equation of the general will 
with the "sum of the differences." If this phrase is taken literally, then 
Plamenatz's complaint is probably justified. But the surrounding passages 
indicate that what Rousseau means by the "sum of the differences" is what 
Plamenatz designates x, not a+b-+c. In a footnote to the passage in question 
Rousseau says that "the agreement of all interests in formed in opposition to 
the interest of each. If there were no different interests, the common inter- 
est, which would never encounter any obstacle, would scarcely be felt." 
(11,3:61.) In the succeeding paragraph of the text he goes on to claim that, 
"If, when an adequately informed people deliberates, the citizens were to 
have no communication among themselves, the general will would always 
result from the large number of small differences, and the deliberations 
would always be good." (II,3:61.)15 Furthermore, one of the reasons for 
Rousseau's quarrel with "partial associations" is that, "The differences be- 
come less numerous and produce a result that is less general." (II, 3:61.) 
The point of these passages may be put this way: the general will is the 
"sum of the differences" because Rousseau believes that the more small 
differences there are in society, the more likely people are to recognize and 
pursue the common interest. When there is a clash between the interests of a 
few large groups, the members of each group will tend to see only their 
interests qua members of the group or faction. But when there are a "large 
number" of differences in the particular interests of individuals, the indi- 
interests to vote for it, and that if you have voted in favor of a certain punishment for a 
certain crime you have no business to complain if your wish for a certain general policy is 
applied to you in a particular case." 
4 John Plamenatz, Man and Society, I (London: Longmans, Green, 1963), p. 393. Cf. Virginia 
Held's use of Pareto-optimality to defend Rousseau's mathematics inThe Public Interest and 
Individual Interests, pp. 102-4. 
"This is one of the several cases where G. D. H. Cole's translation in the widely used Everyman 
edition of The Social Contract and Discourses i misleading. Cole translates Rousseau's "grand 
nombre" as "grand total." See The Social Contract and Discourses, ed. and trans. G. D. H. 
Cole (New York: Dutton, 1950), p. 27, and compare Du Contrat Social, ed. Ronald Grimsley 
(Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 128. 
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viduals are better able to see their common interest qua citizens. Each sees 
that he can seldom, if ever, get all that he wants, and he soon perceives the 
need for some sort of rule for allocating the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation. The most reasonable rule, Rousseau suggests, is that which 
regards us all as abstractions - as citizens - for in this way all are treated 
equally. The will of all - the "sum of private wills" - will not produce an 
outcome acceptable to all because, when the "pluses" and "minuses" are 
tallied, it will favor the interests of some at the expense of others. The 
general will, however, is the "sum of the differences" because it represents 
the common ground which all can accept despite their differences. 
With the aid of the interpretation of the general will set out in section 
one of this paper, then, we are able to present coherent accounts of Rous- 
seau's distinction between the general will and the will of all and of his claim 
that upon occasion someone may be "forced to be free." This, together with 
the evidence from Rousseau's statements about the general will, suggests that 
the general will is indeed best understood as a principle to guide decisions 
on public matters. Yet this does not resolve all the problems surrounding 
Rousseau's use of "the general will." Rousseau's mysterious remarks about 
the relationship between voting and the general will - and especially his 
apparently inconsistent claims about whether the individual should look to 
his personal interest or the public interest when voting - have still to be 
explained. To provide this explanation, we shall have to extend the in- 
terpretation offered so far by introducing a distinction between the general 
will and a general will. 
III 
For the most part Rousseau uses "the general will" in the sense of an 
imperative or principle; but he sometimes also speaks of a particular decision 
as an expression of the general will (e.g., 11,3:61). If the people reach a 
decision whose outcome actually promotes the common interest they share 
as citizens, Rousseau tends to say that the people have expressed or declared 
the general will. But here, plainly, we have two different uses of "the general 
will," for decisions neither express nor declare principles: they follow or 
conform to them. These different uses, which are never clearly sorted out by 
Rousseau, are conveniently marked by the distinction between the general 
will - the principle that all public decisions must take into account only the 
interests of the citizen - and a general will - a specific decision which is in 
accordance with this principle. 
This distinction, strange as it may first appear, is analogous to a more 
readily apparent distinction which is drawn in discussions of the public 
interest.16 For however one may define it, the public interest is certainly 
different from a policy which (one believes) is in the public interest. A tax cut 
may be in the public interest, for example, but it is not itself the public 
interest. And if a tax cut is in the public interest, it is only because it some- 
how promotes the public interest. In just this way a policy which conforms to 
the general will is not itself the general will: it is, instead, a general will. 
Rousseau never explicitly draws this distinction, though, and his failure 
to do so obscures important parts of his argument. This is expecially true of 
his remarks about voting. If we attend to the distinction between the and a 
general will, however, we may shed some light on these remarks. 
'6Clarke Cochran develops a similar distinction between "x is a means to the common good," "x 
is a common good," and "x is the common good" in "Yves R. Simon and 'The Common 
Good': A Note on the Concept," Ethics 88 (April 1978): 237. 
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Rousseau's comments on voting actually present two related problems. 
The first of these concerns the connection between the general will and 
majority-rule; the second involves the apparent contradiction in Rousseau's 
statements about how the individual should vote. In the first case the dis- 
tinction between the and a general will proves helpful; in the second it is 
essential. 
Rousseau's brief discussion of majority-rule begins with the acknowl- 
edgement that the social contract requires unanimous consent: "Since every 
man is born free and master of himself, no one . . . can subject him without 
his consent." (IV,2:110.) But he soon goes on to say that, "Except for this 
primitive contract, the vote of the majority always obligates all the others." 
(IV,2:110.) This poses an obvious problem - "How can the opponents be 
free yet subject to laws to which they have not consented?" - and Rousseau 
offers this resolution: 
When a law is proposed in the assembly of the people, what they are being 
asked is not precisely whether they approve or reject the proposal, but 
whether it does or does not conform to the general will that is theirs. Each 
one expresses his opinion on this by voting, and the declaration of the 
general will is drawn from the counting of the votes. 
In these two sentences we have a good example of the unmarked dis- 
tinction between the and a general will. The proposal is to be approved, on 
the one hand, if it conforms to the general will (principle); but a general will 
(specific policy which satisfies this principle) is discovered, on the other 
hand, only by counting votes. Votes are irrelevant to the general will, for 
principles are not discovered by voting, but a general will often cannot be 
ascertained without them.17 Were it not for the difference between the gen- 
eral will qua principle and policies which conform to that principle, Rousseau 
would not even need to discuss voting. 
The point of immediate importance, however, is brought out in the 
remainder of the paragraph. 
Therefore when the opinion contrary to mine prevails, that proves nothing 
except that I was mistaken, and what I thought o be the general will was 
not. If my private will had prevailed, I would have done something other 
than what I wanted. It is then that I would not have been free. (IV,2:110- 
111.) 
While this explanation is complicated and paradoxical, it is not simply 
metaphysical nonsense. Since Rousseau admits that even the people as a 
whole may fail to discern the policy which accords with the general will 
(II,6:67),18 the question here is, why is the majority opinion less likely to be 
mistaken than that of the minority, or of a solitary individual? It is certainly 
possible for one person to be right while everyone else is wrong. But if we 
make certain assumptions, as Barry has shown, then the opinion of the 
majority is more likely to be correct than the minority's.19 This occurs when 
we assume, as Rousseau seems to do, that: (a) there is a uniquely right 
171 say "often" because Rousseau allows that "the commands of leaders" can "pass for expres- 
sions of the general will, as long as the sovereign, being free to oppose them, does not do 
so." (11,1:59). See also Political Economy, p. 216. And see note 26, infra, for a comment on 
the translation of this passage from the Social Contract. 
18Cf. Political Economy, p. 216: "Must the whole nation be assembled at each unforeseen event? 
Such an assembly is all the less necessary because it is not sure its decision would be the 
expression of the general will . ." 
9For a more detailed explanation of this point, see Barry, "The Public Interest," p. 122, and 
Levine, The Politics of Autonomy, pp. 63-72. 
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answer, a specific policy in conformity with the general will, to be found; (b) 
everyone has an equal, better-than-even chance of discerning the right an- 
swer; and (c) everyone wants the right answer to prevail. It may be difficult 
to accept all, or even any, of these assumptions, but this does indicate how 
one might be glad that his own point of view was not victorious. Rousseau's 
point is not that whatever the majority wants is eo ipso the general will, but 
that the majority is simply more likely than the minority to have discovered 
the policy which conforms to the general will. 
One may wonder again what this has to do with freedom. How could a 
person possibly be less free if his opinion had carried the day? The answer 
here, as in the case of the "forced to be free" passage, follows from Rous- 
seau's conception of the just state as the realm of freedom. Rousseau as- 
sumes that in this state all the voters want the policy which best satisfies the 
general will to prevail. If the majority is more likely to perceive that policy, 
then a person whose opinion is in the minority may be said to have voted 
against his will qua citizen: his will was to promote the common interest, but 
his opinion as to what policy would do so was mistaken. "The constant will of 
all the members of the state is the general will, which makes them citizens 
and free." (IV,2:110.) If one sees, therefore, that the policy he favored 
actually (or ostensibly) is not in the common interest, he then recognizes that 
his particular opinion was divergent from his constant will. Since the realm 
of freedom is preserved only through observance of the general will, free- 
dom is diminished whenever a policy contrary to the general will is pursued. 
Anyone who had supported such a policy - along with everyone else- 
would then be less free than he would be if his opinion had not won. 
The second problem with Rousseau's remarks on voting concerns the 
aims of the individual voter. In the first chapters of Book IV, Rousseau 
clearly requires individuals to vote according to their perceptions of. what the 
general will demands; private interests are not to be considered. He also 
provides a vivid description of what happens when the people vote as men 
rather than citizens. "Finally," he says, ". . . when the social bond is broken in 
all hearts; when the basest interest brazenly adopts the sacred name of the 
public good, then the general will becomes mute; all - guided by secret 
motives - are no more citizens in offering their opinions than if the State 
had never existed, and iniquitous decrees whose only goal is the private 
interest are falsely passed under the name of laws." (IV, 1: 108-109.) Yet 
earlier in the Social Contract Rousseau seems to take precisely the opposite 
position when he asks, 
Why is the general will always right and why do all constantly want the 
happiness of each, if not because there is no one who does not apply this 
word each to himself, and does not think of himself as he votes for all? 
Which proves that the equality of right, and the concept of justice it pro- 
duces, are derived from each man's preference for himself and consequently 
from the nature of man .... (11,4:62; emphasis in the original.) 
Certainly there seems to be a contradiction between these passages. If 
we attend to the distinction between the general will and a general will, 
however, we can reconcile Rousseau's, remarks. This is because Rousseau's 
reference in Book II is to the general will, while in Book IV he is concerned 
with a general will. In the passage cited from Book II, in other words, 
Rousseau's purpose is to justify the general will: the principle that requires all 
public decisions to take only the common interest of the citizen into account. 
His argument is that this particular imperative supplies a just basis for a 
political association because it is acceptable to everyone, for everyone can see 
that he is not subjecting himself to arbitrary rule when he agrees to the social 
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compact. All individuals are treated equally by the general will, and "each 
man's preference for himself' leads to "equality of right" under the general 
will. Indeed, the general will qua principle is at the heart of Rousseau's 
attempt to reconcile "what right permits with what interest prescribes, so that 
justice and utility are not at variance." (I, preface:46.)20 
In Book IV, Rousseau's purpose is different. When he says that voters 
must try to decide whether a proposition is in conformity with the general 
will rather than their private wills, he is concerned with determining what 
specific policies or laws are in conformity with the general will. Thus when 
he declares that the voters are to state their opinions on the question, Is 
policy x in conformity with the general will?, and not to follow their particu- 
lar interests when they vote, he is specifying how a general will, or general 
wills, in accordance with the general will can be found. These remarks about 
the aims of the voter pertain to two different aspects of the general will, in 
sum, and they are not contradictory. 
What we find, then, is that drawing the distinction between the and a 
general will enables us to clarify the first and to solve the second of these 
problems generated by Rousseau's remarks on voting. This provides power- 
ful evidence for the validity of the distinction. But it also leads to a difficult 
question: is this distinction indeed implicit in the Social Contract, as I have 
stated, or am I simply reading a helpful distinction into Rousseau's work? I 
doubt that this question can be answered conclusively; yet there are passages 
in Rousseau's writings which indicate that he did have in mind something 
very much like the distinction I have drawn. 
This is suggested in the discourse on Political Economy, for instance, 
when Rousseau states that taxes ought to be levied "through a general will, by 
majority vote, and based on proportional rates that leave no room for an 
arbitrary assessment of taxes."21 Although Rousseau does not call attention 
to his use of "a general will" here, it is clear that he is referring to specific 
policies and decisions, not to the principle that public policy should ignore 
the interests of men. So also is the distinction suggested by a passage in the 
Geneva Manuscript, where Rousseau proclaims that, "Today's law should not 
be an act of yesterday's general will, but of today's. ..."22 Insofar as the 
general will is a principle, of course, it cannot vary from day to day; but how 
we can and should act on that principle may easily vary as circumstances 
change. When we alter and amend our laws, then, we are not changing the 
general will; we are doing what we can to keep our laws - our general wills 
- in agreement with it. 
References to "general wills" in Emile and the Social Contract also support 
my position, for there is no reason for Rousseau to use the plural when 
referring to the general will as a principle. In one passage from Emile Rous- 
seau states that, "Dependence on men . .. engenders all the vices, and by it, 
master and slave are mutually corrupted. If there is any means of remedying 
this ill in society, it is to substitute law for man and to arm the general wills 
with a real strength superior to the action of every particular will."23 The use 
of "the general wills" here is clearly consistent with my account of the dis- 
tinction between the and a general will; yet it may also be interpreted in a 
20 For a helpful account of Rousseau's attempt to unite self-interest with the common interest, 
see Nannerl 0. Keohane, "'The Masterpiece of Policy in Our Century': Rousseau on the 
Morality of the Enlightenment," Political Theory 6 (November 1978): esp. 475-81. 
21 Political Economy, p. 230; emphasis added. 
22Included in On the Social Contract, ed. Masters, p. 181; see also p. 168 and Social Contract 
(II,1:59). 
23Emile, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 85; emphasis added. 
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quite different way. Consider what Roger Masters has to say about the use of 
the plural here: "when speaking of all mankind, Rousseau thereby makes 
clear the inevitable division of the human species into different societies, 
each of which has its own general will."24 Masters' reading of this passage is 
not implausible. But it neither explains nor fits another passage from Emile 
where Rousseau uses the plural: "according to the social pact the sovereign is 
able to act only by the common and general wills and that therefore its acts 
ought similarly to have only general and common objects."25 Here it seems 
clear that what Rousseau is talking about are specific decisions and policies 
which are in accordance with the general will. This is true also of a passage 
in the Social Contract where Rousseau says, "This does not mean that the 
commands of the rulers cannot pass for general wills, so long as the 
Sovereign, being free to oppose them, offers no opposition."26 In at least two 
of these three passages, then, we have further evidence for my claim that the 
distinction between the and a general will is implicit in Rousseau's theory. 
There is, in short, sufficient reason to believe that Rousseau did indeed 
perceive, though perhaps only dimly, the importance of this distinction. Nor 
should this be surprising. For if the general will is best understood as a 
principle requiring us to act in public matters as citizens rather than men, 
then the distinction I have drawn seems to inhere in the logic of the general 
will. 
IV 
We can understand the general will. But this is not to say that Rous- 
seau's notion is free from difficulties or that no further questions need be 
asked. Even if the general will is properly understood, one may still want to 
question some of Rousseau's assumptions and conclusions. This is not the 
place to attempt a full assessment of Rousseau's political philosophy, cer- 
tainly, but I should like to conclude by raising some questions for further 
consideration. 
First, there is the question of how the general will - the principle for 
deciding matters of public policy - is to be applied. What does it mean to 
say, in other words, that public policy must attend to the common interest of 
citizens and ignore the private interests of men? One problem is that the 
viewpoint of the citizen is not always readily apparent. Consider the case of a 
city (or any other political unit) which is dominated by one large industry. 
Cities of this sort often find themselves caught on the horns of a dilemma. 
There may be reliable evidence that pollution from the industry is hazardous 
to the health of those in the community; but eliminating that hazard may 
involve the loss of the industry with all the money and jobs it directly and 
indirectly provides. Everyone in the community will suffer if the hazard is 
not eliminated; yet it is also conceivable that everyone will suffer if the 
industry leaves. In this case is there a single viewpoint which is distinctly the 
citizen's? What would the general will have those in this predicament do? 
By altering the example slightly, we can produce yet another problem 
for Rousseau. Suppose that in this city there are many who will suffer severe 
24 Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau, p. 42. 
25Emile, p. 461; emphasis added. 
26Here I follow Cole's translation of the Social Contract, p. 24, with emphasis added. In the 
Masters' edition the passage is translated, "This is not to say that the commands of leaders 
cannot pass for expressions of the general will, as long as the sovereign, being free to oppose 
them, does not do so." (11,1:59; emphasis added.) Cf. Du Contrat Social, ed. Grimsley, p. 
125: "Ce n'est point a dire que les ordres des chefs ne puissent passer pour des volontes 
generales, tant que le souverain, libre de s'y opposer, ne le fait pas." 
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economic hardship if the industry leaves and a few who, for one reason or 
another, will not suffer at all. In this case all the members of the community 
would share an interest in eliminating the hazard, but all would not share an 
interest in keeping the industry in town. The general will, presumably, 
would require the elimination of the hazard because that would be in the 
interest of the citizens, even though it might spell disaster for most of the men 
in the community. Given possibilities of this kind, is it clear that we should 
always ignore the private interests of men when deciding matters of public 
policy? 
A second set of difficulties arises in connection with Rousseau's remarks 
on the majoritarian decision-rule. If we grant the three assumptions men- 
tioned earlier - that (a) political questions have uniquely right answers; (b) 
everyone has an equal, better-than-even chance of discovering these an- 
swers; and (c) everyone wants the right answers to prevail - then the 
majority is more likely than the minority to hit upon the right answer. But 
these are strong assumptions, and it is not at all obvious that we ought to 
accept them. If these three conditions are not met, moreover, then one who 
voted with the minority may actually be less free when and if he acquiesces to 
the will of the majority. 
Now it is true that Rousseau is talking about the de jure state when he 
argues that those in the minority are mistaken about what the general will 
requires, and perhaps in the de jure state everyone will want the right an- 
swers to prevail. Even if we grant this and the other assumptions, however, 
the problem of civil disobedience is still with us. Should one go along with 
the majority on a matter of conscience simply because he knows that they are 
more likely to be right than he is? Are matters changed if we add, with 
Rousseau, that "the more important and serious the deliberations, the closer 
the winning opinion should be to unanimity"? (IV,2:111.) The size of the 
vote against him will give the conscientious individual pause, no doubt; but 
so long as there is a possibility that the winning side has failed to discover a 
general will which conforms to the general will, there is a case to be made for 
civil disobedience. Rousseau fails to make this case. Should he have done so? 
To answer these questions we shall have to go beyond Rousseau. We 
may find it necessary to refine his analysis and concepts, or even to abandon 
some of them. But the simple fact that it leads to such potentially rewarding 
exploration may well be the most fitting testimony to the richness of Rous- 
seau's political philosophy - and to the importance of understanding the 
general will. 
